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Abstract 
This paper provides a synthesis of the state of knowledge on the economics of skyscrapers. First, 
we document how vertical urban growth has gained pace over the course of the 20th century. 
Second, we lay out a simple theoretical model of optimal building heights in a competitive 
market to rationalize this trend. Third, we provide estimates of a range of parameters that shape 
the urban height profile along with a summary of the related theoretical and empirical literature. 
Fourth, we discuss factors outside the competitive market framework that explain the rich 
variation in building height over short distances, such as durability of the structures, height 
competition, and building regulations. Fifth, we suggest priority areas for future research into the 
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1 Introduction
Land markets have been subject to economics research since the birth of economics
as a modern discipline (Smith, 1776; Malthus, 1798; Ricardo, 1817). Since von
Thuenen (1826), the study of the horizontal structure of urban space has been one
of the main research areas in urban economics. While iconic skylines have long
become distinctive features of cities over the course of the 20th century, it is not
until recently that urban economics research into the vertical structure of cities
has gained momentum. In this paper, we document the vertical growth of cities
and summarize the theoretical and empirical advances in understanding the urban
height profile. We argue that a deeper understanding of the causes and effects of
building heights remains a priority research area in urban economics.
From a positive economics perspective, it is noteworthy that at high densities,
the convex cost of height is the main force that produces an economic equilibrium in
the presence of strong agglomeration economies. Hence, the cost of height critically
determines the economically feasible density and, ultimately, a battery of external
benefits and costs associated with density (Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani, 2019). Verti-
cal spillovers and sorting can make tall buildings a further source of agglomeration
economies (Liu et al., 2018, 2020). From a normative economics perspective, it
is critical to understand the positive productivity spillovers generated within and
around tall buildings and the potential negative effects that may arise due to con-
gestion, shadows, and other disamenities.
Importantly, the horizontal structure of cities is not independent of the vertical
dimension. Use-specific costs and returns to height give residential or commercial
users an edge in the competition for urban land. The price of this inelastically-
supplied factor depends as much on the net returns to height as it does on location-
specific demand. Understanding the causes and effects of tall buildings is critical
to rationalize long-run changes in density and height gradients that are at the very
core of urban economics (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969).
To frame our synthesis of the economics of skyscrapers, in Section 2, we begin by
reviewing the history of technological innovations that have dramatically decreased
the construction cost of tall buildings since the last decades of the 19th century.
The main insight is that progress has been steady and incremental, rather than
punctuated; as a result, the notion of their being a first skyscraper is incorrect.
In Section 3, we present a series of stylized facts on the spatio-temporal spread
of skyscrapers and the pace at which cities have expanded into the third dimension.
Over the past 120 years, the height of the tallest completed buildings in the world
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each year has increased by 1.3% per year, on average. The number of completions
per year has increased at a remarkable rate of 5% per year. There has been a strong
urban bias in this vertical growth. We estimate a city-size elasticity of the number
of skyscraper per capita of 0.27 for a global sample of cities exceeding a population
of one million.
While skyscrapers first appeared in U.S. cities, the centre of gravity has shifted
to Asia since the 1990s. Consistent with this shift, economic growth has become a
more significant determinant of vertical growth in absolute and relative terms. We
estimate that the cross-country elasticity of skyscraper completions with respect to
10-year GDP growth has increased from about 0.5 in the 1970s to about five in
the 2010s, conditional on the effects of population and GDP per capita, which have
remained about constant. Although skyscrapers are among the most durable forms
of capital, the growth effect is also visible along the time dimension within a country.
Since 1910, vertical growth in the U.S. has been highly cyclical, with completions
responding to recessions and periods of growth with a lag of about three to five
years.
These stylized facts motivate much of our analyses and the discussion of the
literature in the subsequent sections. Throughout Sections 4 to 6, we explore the
determinants of the urban height profile within a canonical competitive equilibrium
framework. In Section 4, we connect horizontal land use patterns to the vertical
dimensions of cities. To this end, we lay out a simple model in which developers fac-
ing costs and returns to height make profit-maximizing decisions regarding building
height. Nesting this model of optimal building height into a conventional bid-rent
framework delivers theoretical predictions consistent with the stereotype skyline of
“global” cities. Intuitively, construction costs that are convex in height imply that
tall buildings are only profitable in central locations where the floor space rent is
higher and in large cities, which tend to be denser and more expensive, owing to
inelastically supplied land.
Comparative statics deliver stylized predictions that are informative with respect
to the expected long-run changes in the urban height gradient. Reductions in the cost
of height due to innovations in construction technology should lead to taller buildings
and a steeper height gradient, ceteris paribus. The same applies to the rise of
interactive knowledge-based urban economies, where spatial productivity spillovers
are likely becoming stronger, and more localized (Moretti, 2012). However, improved
transportation has led to the decentralization of population and employment since
the mid-20th century and to flatter rent gradients, which, ceteris paribus, lead flatter
height gradients.
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Empirically, we estimate an elasticity of building height with respect to distance
from the CBD of slightly below 0.3 for large cities in 1900 and 2015. It appears
that demand-side forces pushing for a flatter height gradient and supply-side forces
pushing for a steeper height gradient have largely offset each other in their effect on
the urban height gradient over the 20th century.
In Section 5, we turn to the cost of height. We estimate values of the height
elasticity of per-unit construction cost that range from 0.1 for smaller structures
to 0.25 for tall commercial and 0.56 for tall residential structures. For super-tall
buildings, the literature has found that the elasticity can increase to beyond unity.
In part, the cost of height emerges from a reduction in the share of usable floor area,
which, for a given gross floor area, we estimate to decrease in building height at an
elasticity of 0.05. Since historical construction cost records are difficult to access, we
rely on an indirect approach to quantify the effects of innovations in construction
technology on the cost of height. We estimate the land price elasticity of height
for New York City and Chicago for various points in time from 1870 to 2010. Our
estimates increase from less than 0.25 before 1900 to close to 0.5 after 2000. We
use the theoretical framework from Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018) to translate these
estimates into estimates of the cost of height, which we find to have declined by
about 2% per year in the long-run, on average.
In Section 6, we focus on returns to height. Exploiting within-building variation,
we estimate an elasticity of residential apartment prices with respect to floor height
of about 0.07 for New York City as well as for Chicago. For New York City, we
estimate a value of 0.033 for commercial rents. For buildings up to 40 stories, these
estimates translate into estimates of the building height elasticity of average rent of
0.056 (residential) and 0.026 (commercial). A sizable literature supports the notion
of a height premium, although previous studies may confound height and location
effects as they mostly do not condition on building fixed effects. Liu et al. (2018)
stand out in that they estimate the commercial within-building vertical rent gradient
across a large set of U.S. cities, finding values of the floor elasticity of rent of 0.086
and 0.189 in two different data set. In terms of variation over time, our estimates
suggest that the floor elasticity of residential apartment prices in New York City
decreased by about 50% since the 1990s following a rapid expansion in the supply
of tall residential structures. One interpretation is that the marginal buyer today
occupies a lower rank in the distribution of height preferences.
Sections 5 and 6 jointly confirm that the marginal cost of increasing the height
of a building exceeds the marginal returns at the margin, which is a requirement for
a positive and finite solution for the optimal building height. Another takeaway is
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that both costs of and returns to height vary by use, with implications for horizontal
land use pattern that are ignored in standard models with an emphasis on two-
dimensional space.
While spatial trends in heights tend to conform to the stylized predictions derived
from the canonical framework laid out in Section 4, there is a remarkable degree of
micro-geographic heterogeneity in building heights that deserves attention. Within
one kilometer of the CBD in New York City or Chicago, respectively, the standard
deviation in heights is as large as the average height, suggesting additional forces at
work that shape the height gradient.
In Section 7, we discuss why the very nature of skyscrapers implies “stickiness”
in height adjustments, leading to skylines that are less smooth than predicted by
stylized urban models. Extensions of the standard land-use model rationalize irregu-
lar floor area ratios through the durability of housing stock (Brueckner, 2000), which
is relevant given that skyscrapers are among the most durable forms of capital. The
size of skyscrapers implies that the assembly of suitable parcels takes time and can
be subject to strategic holdout by sellers (Strange, 1995). Option values that build
up over time can lead to periodical overbuilding by developers seeking to preempt
each other (Grenadier, 1995, 1996).
In Section 8, we turn to geology as a determinant of skyscraper development.
Because tall buildings are heavy and exert strong downward forces, foundations must
be constructed to stabilize the structures, so they don’t lean, deferentially settle, or
fall over. Intuitively, bedrock depths are an (exogenous) determinant of skyscraper
heights and locations, since many (but probably not most) skyscrapers are anchored
directly to bedrock. However, foundation costs tend to have high fixed costs and
low marginal costs with respect to height, so the effect on the cost of height is
moderate from an engineering perspective. Research on New York City (Barr et al.,
2011; Barr, 2016) suggests bedrock has an effect on the micro-geographic location
of skyscrapers within economic clusters such as Downtown but has a limited impact
on the location of the clusters.
In Section 9, we engage with the common perception that developers add extra
height to project their out-sized egos onto their respective cities. Clark and Kingston
(1930), Al-Kodmany and Ali (2013), and Helsley and Strange (2008) make the the-
oretical case that in a sequential game where developers compete for the prize of
being the tallest (because they gain personal utility from winning a height competi-
tion), developers will strategically build beyond a fundamentally-justified height to
preempt rivals. Empirical research in this area, however, has yet to achieve a con-
sensus. While some buildings have been estimated to be economically “too tall,” the
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reasons for the added height is not fully understood. Second-order economic benefits
(e.g., tourism, foreign direct investment, advertising, or productivity signaling) may
be at work as much as developers’ desire to create monuments to themselves or win
ego-based competitions. As well, local leaders can use skyscrapers to enhance their
political careers, line their pockets, or provide income to their supporters.
Cities, over time, have aimed to curb building heights to varying degrees in the
name of limiting externalities, such as shadows, or traffic congestion, or because they
feel tall buildings are aesthetically displeasing or reduce the quality of life. Yet, our
review of the research on skyscrapers and regulation in Section 10 reveals limited
evidence on the causes and effects of skyscraper regulations. To date, most of the
related research has focused on the negative collateral effects of height regulations,
such as sprawl or affordability problems (Bertaud and Brueckner, 2005; Jedwab et
al., 2020), but there is virtually no work in economics on the size and scope of
negative externalities or on the impacts on the well-being of residents (Barr and
Johnson, 2020).
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that research into the vertical dimension
of cities is at an early stage. We discuss the potential for future research throughout
in Sections 4 to 10 and collect our thoughts on priority areas in Section 11.
2 A brief history of the skyscraper
In this section, we briefly review the technological history of skyscrapers and the
innovations that have paved the way for cities to increasingly fill the third dimension.
2.1 The First skyscrapers
Among architectural historians, there has been a vigorous debate about what con-
stitutes the first true skyscraper. This is because a skyscraper is inherently a mul-
tifaceted object, and there is no single definition of what makes a skyscraper a
skyscraper. Some point to the first tall commercial structures built after the U.S.
Civil War. Others point to the first buildings to use all-steel framing, while others
point to the first structures to use their height to convey information about the
builders.
The common usage of the word “skyscraper” in the press pre-dated steel-framing
by several years when it was used to describe the class of relatively tall (8-10 floors)
commercial buildings going up in New York and Chicago in the early 1880s (Larson
and Geraniotis, 1987). Reviewing the suite of technological elements needed to
build tall office buildings, engineering historian, Carl Condit, concludes, “If we are
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tracking down the origins the skyscraper we have certainly reached the seminal stage
in New York and Chicago around the year 1870” (Condit, 1988, p. 22).
Nonetheless, the popular belief is that the Home Insurance Building in Chicago,
designed by William Le Baron Jenney, and completed in 1885, was the first skyscraper
in the world (Shultz and Simmons, 1959; Douglas, 2004), Douglas (2004). This belief
is now widely considered among architectural and engineering historians to be false.
The reason is that there does not exist any structure, let alone the Home Insurance
Building, that by itself was fundamentally different from the buildings that preceded
it and which generated a radical transformation after it.
The widespread thinking is that Jenney invented the steel frame. But this is not
true. Rather, his innovation was to use an iron cage to hold up the floors. But the
iron beams were attached to the masonry walls, which bore the load of the building
(Larson and Geraniotis, 1987). In this sense, Jenny’s building represented one of
several that were transitional from the traditional wall-load-bearing building to a
steel-framed one.
When Jenney’s building was completed in 1885, there was no mention in the
public or academic press about his structure being a new building type. To the
engineering community, it seemed one of many that added some innovation to make
buildings lighter, allow for more windows, or improve fire safety. His structure was
innovative, to be sure, but, at the same time, there is nothing so special about it as
to make it qualify as the first clear and true skyscraper.
The idea that Jenny’s building was the first began to emerge in 1896, based on
a flurry of letters written by Jenney’s colleagues to the Engineering Record. They
essentially “voted” him the winner by popularity contest and not by any rigorous
engineering, economic, or aesthetic standards. When Jenney died in 1909, virtually
all his obituaries declared him the skyscraper’s inventor. In short, Jenney’s “victory”
was due more to the structure of his social networks rather than his building’s
structure.
But one thing is for certain, by the early 1890s, the key innovations—the steel-
framed skeletal structure and the electric elevator—were in place to remove the
technological barriers to height. So that from that time forward, skyscraper height
decisions were based on balancing the costs with the revenues and were not so much
determined by engineering barriers per se.
2.2 The 20th Century
For most of the 20th century, technological innovations were incremental. While
engineers learned much more about the physics of stabilizing their buildings from
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wind above and from the geology below, even as late as the 1950s, skyscrapers were
still steel-framed boxes. However, improvements in glass technology, fluorescent
lighting, and air conditioning allowed for a higher fraction of facades to be covered
with glass.
In the 1960s, engineers devised new structural techniques that allowed buildings
to go taller without requiring as much steel per cubic meter. The theories behind
these ideas were well-known in the engineering profession, but it wasn’t until main-
frame computing came along and allowed for simulating and testing these ideas to
validate them for practical use (Baker, 2001).
As buildings rise higher, the wind forces—the so-called lateral loads—rise expo-
nentially with height. After about 15 stories, stabilizing the lateral loads becomes
arguably the dominant element driving increasing marginal costs from adding floors.
The most notable innovation of the 1960s was the framed-tube structure. That
is, the outer part of the structure is comprised of many closely-spaced columns,
which are then attached with horizontal beams. In this way, the building is like a
square tube and is sufficiently rigid to prevent significant sway from wind forces.1
The Twin Towers in New York City used this design. The Sears (Willis) Tower
employed a version of this design by utilizing a tube-within-tube structure.
2.3 Innovations in the 21st Century
Though other structural designs were first used in the 1970s, they have been much
more widely employed in the 21st century, especially in Asia (Ali and Moon, 2007).
For example, the Burj Khalifa uses a buttressed core, which was first implemented in
the 1970s. The building is constructed like a type of pyramid. It has a main central
core and three additional wings or cores which buttress the main one. Together, these
building cores help to create a much stabler building that can rise 0.83 kilometers
with reduced impacts from the wind.
Another innovation is to subject various models to wind-tunnel testing, and the
one that most efficiently counters the wind forces is used. For example, Gensler,
the architectural firm that designed the Shanghai Tower, subjected different designs
to wind-tunnel tests. Based on this, they concluded, “Results yielded a structure
and shape that reduced the lateral loads to the tower by 24 percent - with each
five percent reduction saving about US$12 million in construction costs”(Xia et al.,
2010, p. 13).
1Note that engineers and developers do not aim to make their buildings perfectly rigid, as
this would significantly add to the cost of construction. Instead, the goal is to make tall buildings
sufficiently rigid so that the rate of sway is undetectable by the human nervous system under nearly
all wind conditions.
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Further, many supertall buildings today incorporate mass-tuned dampers. These
are large weights hung like a pendulum toward the top of the tower. When the wind
forces press against the structure, the damper begins to sway in the opposite diction
of the wind, thus dampening the wind’s impact (Lago et al., 2018).
Technological innovations in elevators have included ways to use each shaft more
efficiently, such as running doubledeckers (one cab on top of another), and elimi-
nating separate machine rooms for raising and lowering the cab cables. Machine-
learning algorithms allow cars to more quickly move passengers between floors and
reduce waiting times. These innovations not only lowers the marginal costs of go-
ing taller, but also improve the occupants’ quality of life and lower the building’s
operating expenses (Al-Kodmany, 2015).
2.4 The Future
Given the rapid economic growth and urbanization around the world, the demand
for supertalls continues to be brisk. Competition in the skyscraper construction
industry pushes firms to innovate in order to produce taller buildings at lower costs.
One of the key remaining problems is that as buildings become taller, the elevator
rope needs to be proportionally longer and heavier. However, at some point, the rope
becomes so heavy it can no longer carry itself (Al-Kodmany, 2015). ThyssenKrupp,
for example, is developing a rope-less elevator that will move via magnetic levitation.
Presumably, once the elevator rope is made obsolete, it will remove a bottleneck to
constructing the first mile-high skyscraper.
3 Stylized facts
In this section, we present stylized evidence on the spatio-temporal diffusion of
skyscrapers.
3.1 Evidence
We begin by illustrating the tallest skyscraper completions by year over the 20th
and 21st centuries in Figure 1. The pattern is cyclical, and there are several peaks
throughout history. From 1908 to 1913, three buildings held the title of the tallest
building in the world, all exceeding 200 meters and all located in New York City.
World War I induced a period of less ambitious construction before the next wave
of skyscraper development culminated in the famous skyscraper race in which the
Chrysler Building was defeated by the iconic 380-meter-tall Empire State Building.
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Following the Great Depression and World War II, it took until the 1950s before
the tallest buildings started to reach the levels of the late 1920s. A new level was
reached in the 1970s when the World Trade Centre took the crown from the Empire
State Building after nearly four decades. It was rapidly overtaken by the 440-meter-
tall Willis (Sears) Tower in Chicago, the first record-breaking skyscraper outside of
New York City.
Following the oil crisis, there was a dip in tallest constructions until the 1990s
when skyscraper development gained new momentum, this time in a much more in-
ternational context. The Petronas Towers (1998) and the Taipei 101 (2004) pushed
the limits to 452 and 508 meters, respectively, before the Burj Khalifa set the record
of 828 meters in 2009. Since then, it has become the norm that the tallest comple-
tions within a year exceed 500 meters (about 100 floors).
Figure 1: Tallest completions
Sources: Data from https://www.emporis.com/ and https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/
The same cyclically is visible in the volume of skyscraper completions depicted
in Figure 2. If anything, the pace of vertical growth since the 1990s is even more
impressive in this chart. Since the 1990s, construction activity has shifted to Asia. In
2002, Asia took over from North America as the region with the largest cumulative
number of skyscrapers. Today, 43% of the world’s 150-meter or taller towers are in
China alone (including Hong Kong).
To quantify the positive long-run trends in heights and volumes, we regressed
the log of heights and completions against a yearly time trend in Table 1. Over 120
years, the heights of tallest completions have increased at an average rate of 1.3%.
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Figure 2: Skyscraper completions by year
Note: A skyscraper is a building that is at least 150 m tall. Source: https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/
The volume of completions exceeding 150 meters has increased at an even larger
percentage of 4.9%. Given that simple log-linear trends explain 63% and 82% of
the variation in tallest heights and skyscraper volumes over time, it seems fair to
conclude that pronounced vertical growth, historically, has been the norm rather
than the exception.
In Figure 3, we take a closer look at the spatial diffusion of skyscrapers. The first
skyscraper outside the U.S. was completed in Brazil (the Altino Arantes Building) in
the 1940s. Skyscrapers reached many of the larger and economically more developed
countries during the second half of the 20th century. However, many countries,
including developed countries, have remained resistant to adopting the technology.
It took until the 2010s for skyscrapers to reach Italy and Switzerland. Ireland and
Portugal do not have any skyscrapers (150 m or taller) to date.
Only 59 out of 193 nations (30%) have at least one skyscraper. And 80% of
all skyscrapers are in eight countries. In per-capita terms, skyscraper penetration
today is generally largest in North America, South-East Asia, and Australia. Small
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Table 1: Long-run trends in skyscraperization









Year 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 120 120 120 120
R2 .627 .787 .819 .906
Notes: Unit of observation is years. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
states in which the largest city dominates the city system, such as Panama or the
United Arab Emirates reach the highest penetration, in line with skyscrapers being
a distinctively urban phenomenon.
The degree of urban bias in the distribution of skyscrapers is striking as 50%
of the world’s skyscrapers are located in just 17 cities, though a total of 315 cities
worldwide have at least one. Hong Kong leads the list with 1453 buildings of at
least 100 meters, with New York City coming in second at 823. Of the top twenty
cities around the world, eight are in China (including Hong Kong). 15 out of 20 are
in east Asia. Only three cities in North America (New York, Chicago, and Toronto)
make the list (https://www.emporis.com/, Accessed May 1, 2020).
Figure 4 sheds additional light on the urban bias in the distribution of skyscrap-
ers. There appears to be a size-threshold beyond which the skyscraper technology
becomes increasingly viable. For cities that exceed a population of one million, the
number of skyscrapers increases more than proportionately in city size. Our esti-
mates from a global sample of cities imply a city size elasticity of the per capita
number of skyscrapers of 1.27− 1 = 0.27. We find somewhat larger estimates when
restricting the sample to cities in the U.S. (0.34) or China (0.45). In contrast, if we
consider cities with a population of less than one million, the relationship between
city size and the number of skyscrapers is much weaker.
Figure 3 is broadly consistent with the spread of skyscrapers from economically
developed countries to countries that are developing. This impression is substan-
tiated by Figure 5. Since the 1970s, economic growth has become a much more
powerful predictor of a country’s skyscraper completions, whereas the effect of GDP
per capita (and population) has remained about the same.
The relationship between economic growth and skyscraper construction is also
visible in the time-series of U.S. skyscraper completions depicted in Figure 6. Vol-
umes of skyscraper completions along with tallest heights tend to increase during
boom periods. Once the economy contracts, completions and heights plummet.
There is a lag of about three to five years in the economic growth effect, which
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Figure 3: Skyscraperisation by country
(a) Year of first skyscraper
(b) Skyscrapers per capita
Note: A skyscraper is a building that is at least 150 m tall. Source: https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/, as of
2018. Population data from https://data.worldbank.org/.
is intuitive since planning and building a skyscraper takes time (panel b). In this
context, it is worth noting that there is no evidence for the common belief that
skyscraper heights can be used to forecast economic downturns (Barr et al., 2015).
In any case, the sensitivity of vertical growth to the short-run economic cycle is
quite striking, given that skyscrapers are among the most durable forms of capital.
Emporis, who maintains one of the most comprehensive databases on tall buildings,
record only a hand full of teardowns out of nearly 4,000 skyscrapers. The only
recorded demoliton or destruction in the class of tall buildings exceeding 250 meters
are are New York’s Twin Towers in the World Trade Centre.
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Figure 4: Skyscrapers and city size
Note: Skyscrapers and population for cities around with world, with at least one 150m+ skyscraper. ln(#
skyscrapers) is residualised in regressions against country fixed effects. Black solid line are from locally weighted
regressions using a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.25. Confidence bands are at the 95% level. Vertical line
marks the log of 1 M. Skyscraper data is from https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/; accessed Feb. 2020.
Population data are from several sources (available upon request) and are the most currently available counts for
the metropolitan regions, which includes the central city and surrounding population agglomerations.
Figure 5: Determinants of skyscraper completions
Note: Markers illustrate estimates from country-level regressions of log # completions against the log of 10-year
GDP growth, log of GDP per capita and log of population (not reported for clarity of the graph; the estimated
elasticity is close to 0.5 throughout) by decade. Confidence bands are at the 95% level. Sources: Skyscraper data
is from https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/. Country level population and GDP is from
https://data.worldbank.org/. GDP is constant 2010 US$.
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Figure 6: Skyscraper completions in the U.S.
(a) Time trend
(b) Lag in growth effect on completions
Note: In panel (a), completions and tallest building heights are residualised in regressions against semi-log-linear
trends. The residuals are then smoothed using exponential three-year moving averages. Recessions are defined as
years with negative real GDP per capita growth. In panel (b), point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are
from Poisson regressions of the number of completions against indicators for recessions (left) or abnormal growth
(right) lagged by the indicated number of years, controlling for a time trend. Recessions are defined as years with
negative real GDP per capita growth. Abnormal growth periods are periods with the real GDP per capita growth
exceeds the long-run median (about 2%). Skyscrapers: https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/. Real GDP per
capita: https://www.measuringworth.com/
3.2 Summary
Countries adopt the skyscraper technology if GDP per capita is sufficiently high,
and there is at least one large city. Besides wealth and urbanization, economic
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growth as become an increasingly important determinant. However, these demand-
side conditions are not sufficient, as many wealthy countries, especially in Europe,
tend to avoid building skyscrapers.
Skyscrapers have shown a secular increase in their heights over the long run, sug-
gesting steady, if not predictable, improvements in building technology. Skyscraper
construction also demonstrates clear building cycles, which are tied, in part, to the
business cycle (Glaeser, 2013).
4 Vertical and horizontal city structure
In this section, we explore how the urban height profile is shaped by demand and
supply in competitive land markets. To this end, we introduce a simple partial equi-
librium framework in which building heights are set by profit-maximizing developers
who face height-related costs and returns. We use this framework to explore how
the internal structure of cities endogenously responds to exogenous changes such as
innovations in construction technology. We provide evidence that empirically sub-
stantiates the stylized predictions and review the related theoretical and empirical
literature.
4.1 An illustrative partial equilibrium framework
We start from a simplistic demand side of urban real estate markets, which we
assume to be fully described by indifferent users that trade a ground-floor bid rent
pU against the value of an amenity AU that depends on distance D from an arbitrary
central point.
pU = pU(AU(D)) (1)
We assume that ∂p
U
∂AU
> 0 and ∂A
U
∂D
< 0, consistent with the standard monocentric
city model (Brueckner, 1987). U ∈ C,R indexes commercial (C) and residential (R)
use. Turning to the supply side, we follow Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018) and assume
that homogeneous developers face the following profit function in per unit of building
footprint L terms:
π(SU) = p̃U(SU)SU − c̃U(SU)SU − 1
dU
rU , (2)
where SU = F
U
LU
is a measure of building height that multiplies building footprint
to homogeneous floor space FU . rU is the land bid-rent offered by the developer, with
0 < dU ≤ 1 giving the fraction of a parcel that is developable. Per-unit construction
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costs c̃U(cU , SU) depend on the baseline construction cost cU for a one-storey building
and are a convex function of height since taller buildings require more sophisticated
structural engineering, facilities such as elevators, and more building materials, so
∂c̃U
∂SU
> 0 and ∂
2c̃U
∂SU
> 0. The average per-unit rent p̃U(pU(D), SU) depends on the
ground floor rent pU(D) and on height SU since being at a higher floor is an amenity













assuming perfect competition, free entry and exit, and zero profits, the equilibrium
land price rU
∗
is pinned down as the residual in the profit function. Since SU
∗
depends on pU , which depends on D, rU
∗






Intuitively, a more central location leads to a higher ground-floor rent, leading to
a greater optimal building height and higher profits per land unit, which capitalise
into the land rent.
For a graphical illustration of the urban gradients and some simple comparative
statics we impose convenient parametrizations. We assume homogenous firms and
households, Cobb-Douglas production (with firms using floor space and freely traded
capital as inputs), Cobb-Douglas consumption (with households consuming a basket
of tradable goods and non-tradable floor space under an income constraint), profit
maximisation and utility maximisation, and perfect spatial competition leading to
spatially invariant profits and utility. We can then derive the ground floor bid rent
as pU = aU(AU)
1
1−αU , where 0 < 1−αC < 1 is the share of floor space at firm inputs,
0 < 1 − αR < 0 is the consumption expenditure share on housing, aC is constant
determined by αC , and aR is a constant that depends on αR and household income.
We further assume AU = bue−τ
UD where bu > 0 is a constant that determines the
amenity level at the central point, p̃ = pUSU
ωU
, and c̃ = cUSU
θU
, where ωU > 0 and
θU > 0 are the height elasticities of average per-floor space rent and construction
cost. For more detail on the chosen functional forms, we refer to Section A1.1 in the
appendix.
We list the parameter values we use in 2. These values are not directly taken
from the literature and do not necessarily conform to the estimates we provide later
in the paper. However, they are roughly consistent with values in the literature and
suitable for the stylized representation of an abstract city. Based on these values,
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we derive the parametric equivalents to (1), (3) and (4) in Figure 9.
Table 2: Parameters
Parameter Value Further reading
αC Share of floor space at inputs 0.15 (Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002)
αR Share of floor space at consumption 0.33 (Combes et al., 2018)
θC Commercial height elasticity of construction cost 0.5 (Ahlfeldt and McMillen, 2018)
θR Residential height elasticity of construction cost 0.5 (Ahlfeldt and McMillen, 2018)
ωC Commercial height elasticity of rent 0.1 (Liu et al., 2018)
ωR Residential height elasticity of rent 0.1 (Liu et al., 2018)
τC Productivity decay 0.01 (Ahlfeldt et al., 2020)a
τR Utility decay 0.01 (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015)
Notes: These parameter values are chosen in an ad-hoc fashion for a stylized representation. They are not taken from
individual papers and do not confirm to the estimates we provide later in the paper. The last columns provides a references
for the interested reader for further reading, but not necessarily the source of a point estimate. a The parameter value is
consistent with the commercial rent gradient estimated by Ahlfeldt et al. (2020) for a large set of global cities, assuming
αC = 0.15. We set the amenity scale parameter arbitrarily to bC = bR
3
and bR = 10000 to generate the conventional land
use pattern. We set the share of developable land to dC = dR = 1 for simplicity.
Figure 7: Urban gradients
Note: Parameter choices: αC = 0.15, αR = 0.66, bC = bR
3
, bR = 10000, τC = τR = 0.01, dC = dR = 1, cC = cR =
1, ωC = ωR = 0.1, θC = θR = 0.5. These parameter values are chosen in an ad-hoc fashion for a stylized
representation. While they are broadly consistent with values in the literature (see Table 2), they do not
necessarily conform to the empirical estimates we contribute to the literature.
The ground floor bid rent curves for commercial and residential users naturally
decrease in distance from the central point to compensate users for the associated
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amenity loss. Note that we assume the same spatial decay τU in the amenity spillover
for firms and residents. In our parametrization, the commercial bid rent curve is
steeper because αC > αR, which implies that firms can adjust their use of space
more easily to changes in prices. In central areas, firms, therefore, have a relative
advantage over residents when competing for space. The height gradient mirrors
the ground floor rent gradient in that it decreases faster for commercial than for
residential buildings. In keeping with the stereotype of global cities, tall commercial
buildings in a central business district (CBD) are surrounded by smaller residential
buildings. Because the height elasticity of net costs θU − ωU = 0.4 is smaller than
unity, changes in ground floor bid rents trigger more than proportionate changes in
building height, resulting in a height gradient that is steeper than the ground floor
bid rent gradient. The developer’s ability to multiply land to floor space via height
results in land bid rents that increase more than proportionately in floor space rents.
Hence, Figure 9 illustrates how tall buildings rationalize extreme differentials in land
prices across small areas such as documented by Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2014a).
From the perspective of an individual developer, a high land price may be ex-
ogenously given, seemingly creating an incentive to build taller to use an expensive
input factor more intensely. Within the canonical framework developed here, how-
ever, it is a higher floor space rent (left panel in Figure 9) that makes a taller building
more profitable (middle panel), resulting in greater profits, which eventually capital-
ize into the price of the inelastically supplied factor land (right panel). Profits can
become negative if the ground floor rent falls below the minimum construction cost,
leading to a negative land bid rent. In Figure 9 the city ends where both commercial
and residential land bid rents turn negative. Competition from a non-urban user
with a positive bid rent will naturally result in a smaller urban area.
While the purpose of of the theoretical framework is to provide a stylized repre-
sentation of an abstract city, we note that the chosen parametrization generates
a pattern that is roughly consistent with real-world settings in which D corre-
sponds to distance from the CBD in kilometers. It is reassuring that the chosen
parametrization implies the following semi-elasticities that are within the range








1−αR = −0.03, in










(1−αC)(ωR−θR) = −0.13, in line with Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018). The
analytical solution for the land rent semi-elasticity is complex and not constant in




= −0.32; ∂ln rC
∂D
= −0.15, both well within the range of extant estimates
summarized by Ahlfeldt and Wendland (2011).
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Figure 8: Comparative statics
Note: Baseline choices for baseline: αC = 0.15, αR = 0.66, bC = bR
3
, bR = 10000, τC = τR = 0.01, dC = dR =
1, cC = cR = 1, ωC = ωR = 0.1, θC = θR = 0.5. These parameter values are chosen in an ad-hoc fashion for a
stylized representation. While they are broadly consistent with values in the literature (see Table 2), they do not
necessarily conform to the empirical estimates we contribute to the literature.
In Figure 8, we use the same framework to conduct some simple comparative
statics analyses. In the upper-left panel, we decrease θU to simulate the effects of
seminal improvements in construction technology discussed in Section 3. A lower
cost of height results in taller buildings, which is intuitive. Perhaps more inter-
estingly, a 10-percent reduction in the cost elasticity of height from θU = 0.5 to
θU = 0.45 leads to an increase in height at the central point by more than 50%.
This strong sensitivity of efficient building heights to changes in construction tech-
nology may play a critical role in explaining the rapid vertical growth global cities
have been experiencing.
In the upper-right panel, we increase the cost of height for residential buildings
by increasing θC = 0.6. Tall residential buildings typically have a smaller floor
plate size (due to the need for more exterior walls), use different materials (e.g., all
concrete due to acoustic reasons), and have more complex facades (with balconies
and sun rooms), none of which are advantageous for the construction of very tall
buildings (Smith et al., 2014). In keeping with intuition, the optimal building height
of residential buildings decreases. The area over which commercial developments
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are relatively more profitable increases (indicated by the dark-shaded area). This
counterfactual illustrates how vertical costs can shape horizontal land use pattern.
In our framework, an increase in height is isomorphic to a reduction in the returns
to height. Hence, an increase in the residential height elasticity of floor space rent
has the opposite effects on the residential height gradient and the size of the central
business district as illustrated in the bottom-left panel.
In the last counterfactual in the bottom-right panel, we consider the effect of an
increase in the degree of interactiveness in urban economic activity that has been
documented by Michaels et al. (2018). More interactive occupations are typically
in more knowledge intense industries which face highly localized external returns to
scale (Rosenthal and Strange, 2001). Hence, we increase the value of the commercial
amenity aC and the decay of commercial spillovers τC at the same time. The intuitive
result is that commercial building heights increase near the central point, owing to
increasing bid rents, but decrease more steeply in distance.
There is a strong intuition that the cost of height must have decreased since
the late 19th century due to seminal innovations such as the elevator and the steel
frame and incremental improvements in structural engineering and material science
ever since. The urban bias in knowledge-based tradable services that have fueled
economic growth since the mid 20th century has led to increasing rents in grow-
ing cities, further promoting vertical growth. Given that the willingness-to-pay for
amenities generally seems to be increasing over time, it is also likely that returns
height increased over time. The rather unambiguous prediction is that building
heights should have increased over time, which is in line with the stylized facts
provided in Section 3.
For the height gradient, predictions are more ambiguous. Ceteris paribus, in-
novations in construction technology imply a steeper height gradient. Increasingly
important localized spillovers likely work in the same direction. However, decentral-
ization of employment and population has been a major urban trend (Baum-Snow,
2007; Baum-Snow et al., 2017), going hand in glove with flattening price gradients
(McMillen, 1996; Ahlfeldt and Wendland, 2011), which in turn lead to flatter height
gradients in theory. Height gradients per se, are therefore not directly informative
about the effects that technological innovations on the housing supply side have on
urban economies.
4.2 Estimating the height gradient
To contrast the comparative statics with data, we begin by illustrating the spatial
distribution of average building heights at different points in time in the two most
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vertical U.S. cities in Figure 9. Over the course of the 19th century, building heights
increased in absolute and relative terms in the centre of New York city. The elasticity
of building heights with respect to distance from the CBD almost doubled. In
contrast, the height gradient is more stable in Chicago, suggesting that relative
increase in building heights in New York may be caused by city-specific factors.
Figure 9: Height gradients in New York City and Chicago
Note: CBD in New York City is the Empire State Building. CBD in Chicago is .... Data are from...
Indeed, pooling 55 North American cities sampled by Ahlfeldt et al. (2020),
shown in Figure 10, reveals that the urban height profile, in relative terms, re-
mained rather stable over more than one hundred years. While, of course, absolute
heights increased significantly, our estimates of the elasticity of height with respect
to distance from the CBD, at 0.28, are almost identical for buildings that existed in
2015 and in 1900.
In Table 3, we further zoom out to cover all 125 global cities for which Ahlfeldt et
al. (2020) identify “global” prime locations (our CBD proxy). We focus on the tallest
building within a one-kilometer distance ring from the CBD since we presumably
measure the height of the tallest building with less error than the height of the av-
erage building. We estimate a semi-elasticity of height with respect to distance that
is smaller in the contemporary cross-section than in the historic sample (columns
1 and 2). The implied contemporary elasticity estimate is somewhat larger since
the sample mean distance is greater. Regarding the counterfactual in the upper-left
panel of Figure 8, we may tentatively conclude that over the 20th century, reductions
in the cost of height (θ) and the cost of CBD access (τ) have about offset each other
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Figure 10: Tallest buildings by North American city, and distance from the CBD
Note: Each bar illustrates the height of the tallest building within a one-km bin to the west or the east of the CBD
in one of 55 North American cities. Height data from Emporis. CBDs are the ”global prime locations” identified
by Ahlfeldt et al. (2020). Negative (positive) distance values indicate a location in the west (east) where the
x-coordinate in the World Mercator projection is smaller (larger) than the x-coordinate of the CBD. Average
height elasticities estimated conditional on city fixed effects. Data from https://www.emporis.com/ (see Ahlfeldt
and McMillen (2018) for details).
in their impact on the (relative) height gradient.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, we find that the commercial height gradient
is steeper than the residential height gradient. A convenient way of rationalizing
such differences in a bid-rent framework is to assume that the cost of distance from
the CBD is larger for commercial users sine agglomeration spillovers decay faster
in distance than does residential utility owing to commuting costs. However, as we
have illustrated in Figure 9, relatively steep commercial rent and height gradients
can also be rationalized at a uniform cost of distance (τC = τR) if the cost share
of floor space in production is smaller than the expenditure share of floor space in
consumption (αC < αR). As illustrated by the counterfactual in the upper-right
panel of Figure 8, a relatively flatter residential height gradient may also originate
from the supply side if the cost of height is relatively larger for tall residential
buildings (θR > θC). We will return to this scenario in Section 5. The remaining
columns of Table 3 illustrate how the height gradient is steeper in North American
cities than in European or Asian cities. This suggests a role for land use regulation,
which we discuss in Section 10.
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Table 3: Height gradient estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln(height) Ln(height) Ln(height) Ln(height) Ln(height) Ln(height) Ln(height)
Distance from -0.069∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
City fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
d ln(y)/d ln(x) -.23 -.27 -.33 -.26 -.12 -.12 -.35
Building Sample ta ≤ 1900 All Comm.b Residential Asia Europe North A.b
Observations 344 3469 1294 1185 2081 662 419
R2 .494 .559 .679 .647 .427 .331 .376
Notes: a: Completion year. b Commercial. c: North America. Unit of observation is city-distance bin (1 km). Height
is the heigh of the talles building within a one-km distance bin. Building data from Emporis. CBD definitions for 125
global cities from Ahlfeldt et al. (2020). Elasticities computed at the sample means. Data from Empiris (see Ahlfeldt
et al. (2020) for details). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.3 Related theoretical research
Height is typically not modeled explicitly in urban economics models. Yet, urban
economics models of the housing supply side typically feature some notion of struc-
tural density, broadly defined as housing services per land unit (Epple et al., 2010).
Housing developers optimally adjust the use of capital and land to produce hous-
ing, leading to higher structural densities. While structural density is technically
closer to the floor-area-ratio (FAR) than height, the two measures are mechanically
correlated since there are natural bounds for the site occupancy index.
A range of models has linked the supply side to the demand side to rationalize
the internal structure of cities. To this end, the monocentric city model has been
a workhorse tool in urban economics for at least half a century. As in the above
toy model, spatial competition leads to bid rents that decline with distance from
the CBD to offset for transport cost. The canonical Brueckner (1987) version of the
model, which draws from Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969), features a
supply side in which profit-maximizing developers respond to changes in bid rents by
providing structural densities that decline with tne distance from the CBD. Unlike
in the quantitative framework outlined in Section 4.1, there is aggregate demand and
supply. The market-clearing condition can be used to determine either the utility of
residents in a city or the population size of a city, depending on whether the open
or closed-city model is employed. However, land use segregation is not a feature of
this class of models that focus on the housing sector.
More recent models of internal city structure such as Fujita and Ogawa (1982)
and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) account for the spatial distribution of land
uses but exclude from their model the housing and office supply side. Grimaud
(1989) shows how to incorporate a housing supply side into a framework akin to Fu-
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jita and Ogawa (1982). In the quantitative spatial model of internal city structure
developed by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), land use is endogenously determined with devel-
opers producing structural density. Still, since the cost of height is not use-specific,
the horizontal land use pattern is independent of the supply side and the vertical
dimension of cities. Most extant models of internal city structure also do not differ-
entiate between within- and between- and building transport cost (Sullivan, 1991)
and do not take into within-building spillovers that may arise if skyscrapers promote
interactions (Helsley and Strange, 2007).
A notable exception in the theoretical urban economics literature is the model by
Henderson et al. (2016), which not only incorporates height but also distinguishes
between a building technology for the formal (tall and durable) and the informal
(flat and malleable) sector. Their model predicts that in developing cities, land
will be developed informally first, and then formally, with periodical adjustments to
changing economic circumstances. Curci (2017) is an example of how to model the
housing supply side through convex cost of height in a monocentric city model that
is nested in a Rosen-Roback type spatial equilibrium framework.
4.4 Related empirical research
The literature on the evolution of height gradients is still nascent and largely confined
to particular cities. For New York City, a few studies have looked at the evolution of
building heights and densities across space and time, and how they may be influenced
by geology, agglomeration benefits, and other factors. (Barr and Tassier, 2016; Barr
et al., 2011; Barr, 2012). Barr and Cohen (2014) study the evolution of the floor area
ratio (FAR) gradient for commercial buildings in New York City across both time
and space. They find that the FAR gradient for the city as a whole flattened over the
first half of the 20th century, then remained relatively steady between the late-1940s
and mid-1980s, and then flattened to a new “plateau” over the last quarter-century.
For Chicago, Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018) evaluate the evolution of height and
land price gradients over time, providing estimates similar to the ones reported here.
Henderson et al. (2016) provide a unique analysis of the urban height profile in the
context of a developing city. They document that in Nairobi, the built volume
in the core city increased by more than 50% over 12 years. They also show that
the height gradient is flatter in the informal than in the formal housing sector in
Nairobi. This finding is consistent with the lack of capital access among those who
build in the informal sectors (Bertaud, 2018). More loosely related, there is an
older literature that has estimated the rate at which population density decreases in
distance from the CBD summarized in McDonald (1989). Thus, there is an intimate,
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which is consistent with the standard monocentric model (Brueckner, 1987). But
as discussed in Bertaud (2018), the negative density gradients can reverse in non-
market economies, such as China or the former Soviet Republics, where planning
often places high-rise social housing projects far from the city center.
Since skyscrapers accommodate density at the extreme, they are a relevant phe-
nomenon for the study of agglomeration economies. Moretti (2012) argues that the
increase in the returns to agglomeration has increased the demand for central city
locations and hence increased the steepness of the height gradient in these locations,
a reasoning that we echo in the bottom-right panel of Figure 8. Solid bedrock has
been proposed as an instrumental variable for agglomeration since it presumably
reduces the cost of tall buildings (Combes et al., 2010). Building on this idea, Curci
(2020) shows that skyscrapers add to the productivity of locations above and beyond
a generic density effect. This finding is consistent with Liu et al. (2020) who, focus-
ing on vertical density gradients, provide evidence that is suggestive of productivity
spillovers from nearby employment within a building.
4.5 Potential for future research
One avenue for future theoretical research is to incorporate height-related agglomer-
ation and dispersion forces into models of internal city structure. One step towards
accounting for implications of the vertical dimension of cities for horizontal land use
pattern would be to allow for use-specific costs of height.
While natural amenities, endogenous agglomeration, and transport networks
have been explored as sources of persistence in the internal structure of cities (Lee
and Lin, 2017; Brooks and Lutz, 2019; Ahlfeldt et al., 2020), the durability of build-
ing stock has been overlooked. Skyscrapers typically occupy the most productive
urban areas and potentially represent an additional source of path-dependency. At
the same time, vintage effects may encourage shifts in the spatial structure of cities
as building capital depreciates (Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009). Hence, aging tall
building stock could theoretically promote the emergence of edge cities (Henderson
and Mitra, 1996). Since skyscrapers are extremely durable, they may play a signifi-
cant role in moderating how urban economies shift between multiple steady states.
In this context, it may be worth revisiting the current workhorse models with a view
to incorporating durable building stock.
On the empirical front, there is further need for additional studies that analyse
the evolution of height gradients overtime beyond a case study context. The analysis
of within-skyscraper productivity spillovers and transport costs also is a priority area
for empirical research into the vertical dimension of cities. In the longer run, evidence
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may motivate theoretical research to incorporate skyscraper-related agglomeration
and congestion forces into models of the internal structure of cities.
5 The costs of height
To avoid hyper-concentration of economic activity into a singular point, urban eco-
nomics models require a dispersion force. Inelastically provided land represents a
natural source of such a dispersion force. In models that incorporate a housing sup-
ply side, the amount of usable housing services is not per-se limited. The dispersion
force then emerges from marginal costs of housing services that increase in structural
density.
Building height is an important factor in this context since beyond a certain
density level, increases in density can only be achieved through increases in height.
In the theoretical framework laid out in Section 4.1, the cost of height is monitored
by θU , the height elasticity of per-unit construction cost. In this section, we provide
estimates of θU and explore how innovations in construction technology may have
affected the cost of height. In doing so, we also review the related literature.
5.1 Estimating the cost of height
Figure 11 illustrates how the per-unit construction cost of commercial and residential
buildings change in height within a global cross-section of buildings. Evidently,
there is an increasing marginal cost from height as the height elasticity of per-
unit construction cost is positive. Moreover, the elasticity increases in height. For
buildings up to a height of nine floors, we estimate a height elasticity of 0.1. Beyond
that point, the cost of height increases significantly.
From an engineering perspective, several factors rationalize the cost of height.
First, there is the cost of wind bracing because the wind loads increase as buildings
get taller. Second, taller buildings need longer and thicker elevator cables. Third,
high-rises also have greater downward pressure and therefore need stronger founda-
tions. Fourth, the size of plant and equipment increases with height (Picken and
Ilozor, 2015; Barr, 2016).
There is also an important implicit cost that rises with height. As buildings
get taller, on average, there is a reduction in the ratio of usable or rental area to
gross building area. Taller buildings require more space for elevator shafts, and
plant and equipment. Therefore, one of the key trade-offs that developers face when
going taller is whether the revenue or benefits from adding floors offsets the lost
income from the lower floors when an additional elevator shaft is installed (Barr,
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Figure 11: Cost of height
Note: We first regress the log of the ratio of building construction cost over building floor space against decade
fixed effects and country fixed effects and number-of-floor fixed effects. The displayed non-linear functions are the
outcome of locally weighted regressions of the estimated number-of-floor fixed effects against the number of floors,
using a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 10. Confidence bands are at the 95% level. The vertical line marks the
natural log of 10. Data are from from https://www.emporis.com/ (see Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018) for details).
2016). Figure 12 illustrates this mechanism based on a hand-collected data set. We
estimate that for a given gross floor area, the usable floor area decreases in the height
of the building at an elasticity of 0.05.
Figure 11 not only suggests that the cost of height increases in height, but also
suggests there is significant heterogeneity across uses. For taller buildings, we esti-
mate a height elasticity of 0.26 for commercial buildings and about twice as large
elasticity for residential buildings of 0.56. There are several reasons that may ac-
count for this remarkable difference. Residential units require more rooms with
windows and, therefore, typically have smaller floor plates. Moreover, they need
more sophisticated plumbing since residential units are equipped with bathrooms.
Often, they have more complex facades with balconies and sunrooms (Smith et al.,
2014).
The upper-right panel of Figure 8 exemplifies how use-specific differences in the
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Figure 12: Usable floor area vs. height
Note: Each marker is an individual building. The dependent variable is residualied in regressions against country
fixed effects and a time trend. The vertical line marks the natural log of 10. Data was created from several
sources; data and sources are available upon request.
cost of height should affect the height gradient, theoretically. Indeed, we estimate a
height gradient that is about 1.5 times as steep for commercial than for residential
buildings in Table 3, columns (3 and (4). The use-specific cost of height that comes
out of Figure 11 may explain some of the differences in the height gradient to the
extent that there is a sizable fraction of tall buildings. Since the sampled cities used
in Table 3 are global cities that are generally large and have many tall buildings,
this seems plausible.
5.2 Quantifying the effects of innovation on the cost of height
As summarised in Section 2, the history of skyscrapers is marked by technological
innovations. Quantifying the effect of technological innovations on the cost of height
is empirically challenging since historical records of construction costs are not easily
accessible. The height gradient is not directly informative of the cost of height
since it also reflects demand-side factors that shape the spatial structure of a city
(see Section 4 for a detailed discussion). In the absence of feasible alternatives, we
exploit that within a canonical urban model, the relationship between heights and
rents (which collect all demand-side factors) is shaped by the supply side.
In Figure 13, we use our theoretical framework introduced in Section 4.1 to illus-
trates how changes in the functional form of the relationship between bid rents and
building heights are informative of reductions in the cost of height. The implication
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is that we expect reductions in the cost of height over time to lead to an increase in
the elasticity of height with respect to land rent, a prediction that we can test since
(unlike with historical construction cost records) we have access to historic height
and land value data.
Figure 13: The role of the cost of height for the height-rent relationship
Note: Baseline choices for baseline: αC = 0.15, αR = 0.66, bC = bR
3
, bR = 10000, τC = τR = 0.01, dC = dR =
1, cC = cR = 1, ωC = ωR = 0.1, θC = θR = 0.5. These parameter values are chosen in an ad-hoc fashion for a
stylized representation. While they are broadly consistent with values in the literature (see Table 2), they do not
necessarily confirm to the empirical estimates we contribute to the literature.
Figure 14 summarises our estimates of the elasticity of heights with respect to
land prices for New York City and Chicago at different points in time from 1870 to
2010. In line with our theoretical expectation, we find that the elasticity estimates
increase over time. It is noteworthy that there were major reforms in the zoning
regime in Chicago in 1920, 1923 and 1957, which likely affected the land price
elasticity of height. Unlike for Chicago, the trend for New York is quite smooth
across those dates.
Under the parametrisation chosen in Section 4.1, we can use equation (2) along
with the first-order condition of profit-maximisation to obtain the following straight-






. To simplify the toy model, we have abstracted from any role of
regulation and imposed a Cobb-Douglas housing production function. Allowing for
29
Figure 14: Elasticity of height with respect to land price in New York and Chicago
Note: Each point estimate is from a separate regression of the log of height of buildings constructed over a decade
against the log of land value at the beginning of the decade, using the following instrumental variables. Log
distance from Empire State Building and log distance from Wall Street for New York; Log distance from CBD and
log distance from Lake Michigan for Chicago. 1940 missing in both data sets due to lack of completions. 1880 and
1900 missing for Chicago due to missing land value data. 1970 effect for New York is an imprecisely estimated
outlier which is dropped to improve readability. Chicago data are from Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018) and New
York city land values data from Barr (2016) and Spengler (1930). Building height data from the 2018 NYC
PLUTO file from the NYC Dept. of City Planning
a CES production function and a height-dependent share of the lot that is devel-
opable, we obtain the more general formulation of the land price elasticity of height





1 + θU − λU
, (5)
where σU is the elasticity of subsstitution between land and capital and λU is
the height elasticity of extra space which determines how the developable fraction
of a parcel depends on height, so that dU = lS−λ
U
, with l being a constant. Since
we prefer this more general formulation for a quantification of the changes in the
cost of height, we relax the constraints σU = 0, λU = 0. Borrowing the parameter
values σC = 0.66, σR = 0.61, λC = 0.15, λR = 0.1 values from Ahlfeldt and McMillen
(2018), we compute decade-specific θU values using equation (5) and the elastic-
ity estimate reported in Figure 14. We then regress the log of θU against a trend
variable, weighting observations by the inverse of the standard errors of the param-
eter estimates reported in Figure 13 and controlling for period effects in the case of
Chicago. Our tentative interpretation of the results reported in Table 4 is that the
cost of height decreased by about 2% per year over the course of the 20th century,
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although we stress that this interpretation hinges on assuming constant values for
the elasticity of substitution between land and capital and the height elasticity of
extra space.











Decade -0.017∗∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.018∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Period effect - Yes Yes
city New York City Chicago Chicago
Use All Commercial Residential
Observations 12 11 11
R2 0.355 .826 .595
Notes: Unit of observation is decade. Height elasticity of cost inferred from the land
price elasticity of height estimates reported in Figure 13 using equation (5) and parameter
values from Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018). Observations are weighted by the inverse of
the standard errors in 13. Period effects control for level shifts in 1920 and 1957 owing to
changes in zoning regime in Chicago. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5.3 Related research
There is a strand in economics research concerned with the supply of housing ser-
vices, which in per-land-unit terms corresponds to structural density. It is conven-
tional in this literature to assume a Cobb-Douglas housing production function in
which developers produce housing services H rented out at price p using capital and
land L as inputs at the factor shares δ and 1−δ. The first-order conditions of profit-
maximization along with perfect competition and zero profits deliver an intensive-
margin services supply elasticity of d lnH/L
d ln p
= δ
1−δ (Epple et al., 2010; Ahlfeldt and
McMillen, 2014b; Combes et al., 2016; Baum-Snow and Han, 2019). Since under
the assumptions, there is a one-to-one mapping from marginal costs c to rents, the
implied cost elasticity of structural density is simply the inverse of the housing sup-




. While structural density is not the same as height,
they are correlated, especially for taller buildings where the site occupancy index
varies less. For typical land shares in the range of 10% to one third, the implied cost
elasticity of structural density is in line with our estimates of the height elasticity
of construction cost reported in Figure 11. There is a debate, however, whether
the Cobb-Douglas formulation which implies an elasticity of substitution between
land and capital of σ = 1 is an appropriate approximation for the housing produc-
tion function. While the literature has not achieved consensus on this question it
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appears that σ is closer to one for smaller structures (Epple et al., 2010; Ahlfeldt
and McMillen, 2014b; Combes et al., 2016; Baum-Snow and Han, 2019) than for tall
buildings (Ahlfeldt and McMillen, 2018).
There is less economics research that explicitly focuses on the cost of height.
Arguably, the first detailed research on the economics of skyscraper height was that
from Clark and Kingston (1930). In their work, the authors play the role of a hypo-
thetical developer in Manhattan to investigate the skyscraper height that produces
the highest return on investment. They cost out buildings of different heights on
the same lot to see how the costs change with height. With this approach, they find
that for a large lot in midtown Manhattan, using land values and prices from 1929,
the profit-maximising building height was 63 stories. Average total construction
costs (total cost divided by gross building area) are minimized at 22 stories, after
which they increase at an increasing rate. Based on their costings, we estimate an
elasticity of average cost for gross floor space with respect to height of 0.17.
More recent work on the shape of skyscraper cost functions has mostly focused on
data from Hong Kong and other Asian cities. This work is summarized in Picken and
Ilozor (2015). They discuss the various studies which aim to find the height where
average costs are minimized. Interestingly, different studies find different turning
points, which range from 30 meters to 100 meters. However, all studies show that
after a minimum point, costs rise with height.
Most closely related to our estimates of the cost of height are Ahlfeldt and
McMillen (2018) who also exploit the Emporis data set. Employing a more restrictive
parametric estimation approach and extending the sample to very tall buildings they
estimate somewhat larger height elasticities of construction cost.
Outside economics, there is a literature that provides engineering cost estimates.
The rule of thumb is that construction costs tend to increase by 2% per floor (De-
partment of the Environment, 1971), which is in line with more recent estimates
(Tan, 1999; Lee et al., 2011).
There have been few works in economics exploring the rate of technological im-
provements in skyscrapers over time. This may be in part due to the difficulty
of getting detailed data to estimate total factor productivity (TFP), for example.
Skyscraper developers tend to keep their cost data private. For that matter, they
do not tend to itemize costs in a way that readily lend themselves to estimating pro-
duction functions, which require estimates of the quantities used of labor, natural
resources, and capital.
Gort et al. (1999) measure the rate of technological change in building structures
by using a vintage capital model, where technological progress is embodied in the
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form of new capital goods, namely, equipment and structures. Using estimates from
a panel data set of 200 office buildings in the United States, they find technological
progress increased the TFP of the U.S. construction sector at a rate of 1% per
year, and a contribution of 15% of GDP growth over the 1988-1996 period. Chau
and Walker (1988) infer TFP growth in the Hong Kong construction industry using
various construction cost and price indexes. Their TFP index fell in the 1970s but
rose to be about 30% higher by 1984. Other studies confirm that there has been
significant TFP growth in building construction (Zhi et al., 2003; Abdel-Wahab and
Vogl, 2011; Chau et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2013).
5.4 Potential for future research
The economics literature on the cost of height is still at an early stage. There are
few empirical estimates of how construction costs depend on building heights. In
the Emporis data used here and in Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018) is arguably the
most comprehensive database on tall buildings used in economics research so far.
However, construction costs are missing for about 85% of the buildings, so there
is a natural concern about sample selection. More estimates of the cost of height
are needed, ideally from more comprehensive samples and for different classes of
buildings. It is likely that the cost of height is larger for smaller lot sizes, and there
are likely threshold effects in marginal costs at certain heights, but these are difficult
to evaluate with the relatively sparse data that have been used so far.
A better understanding of how costs change with respect to building height may
inform a broader literature in urban economics concerned with the supply side of
housing. This literature is far from reaching a consensus on how substitutable land
and capital are in the production of housing. One line of potential research could
investigate more systematically how the elasticity of substitution between land and
capital changes as places get denser and buildings get taller.
There is a severe lack of evidence on how the cost of height has changed over
time. Technological progress in the construction of tall buildings is obvious, and
our indirect estimates suggest a sizable reduction in the cost of height over time.
To the extent that historical records on construction costs may become accessible,
estimating the change in the cost of height over time is a priority area for research
into the vertical dimension of cities. We require reliable estimates of the change in
construction cost to distinguish between demand-side and supply-side forces that
have shaped many skylines over the 20th century.
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6 The returns to height
Traditional urban economics models focus on how accessibility leads to variation in
firm profits and household utility that capitalizes in horizontal rent gradients. How-
ever, productivity and amenity may also vary within buildings, leading to vertical
rent and density gradients. In the theoretical framework laid out in Section 4.1,
returns to height are monitored by ωU , the rent elasticity of per-unit construction
cost. In this section, we provide estimates of ωU and explore whether there is a time
trend. In doing so, we also review the related literature.
6.1 Estimating returns to height
Figure 15 illustrates how the per-unit rent changes across floors within tall buildings
in New York City and Chicago. Evidently, there is a positive height gradient. For
commercial units, the positive height gradient can originate from increased revenues
due to a signaling of quality to customers, or a lower wage bill if height is a workplace
amenity for which workers are willing to accept a compensating wage differential (Liu
et al., 2018). For residential units, the rent increase likely reflects an amenity effect,
e.g., due to better views. Note that we use an implied residential rent measure based
on observed purchase prices and a constant discount rate to mitigate effects of rent
regulation.
Reassuringly, we estimate an almost identical floor elasticity of residential rent
of about 0.07 for both cities. For New York City, where we also have access to
commercial rent data, we estimate a slightly lower height elasticity of commercial
rent of 0.03. Note that this elasticity is not quite the same as ωU introduced in
Section 4.1, which gives the elasticity of average rent with respect to the height (the
number of floors) of a building.
To relate the two elasticities, let’s denote the floor at which we observe a rent by
x, so that the elasticity we have estimated is ∂ ln p
U (x)
∂ ln(x)
= βU . The aggregate rental















. So, for marginal changes, the




βU = ωU . In practice, changes in height are typically non-marginal due to the
integer floor constraint so that the two elasticities are only asymptotically identical
for infinitely tall buildings. Therefore, to convert the estimated floor elasticity of
rent βU in Figure 15 into a height elasticity of average rent ωU , we generate a series
of artificial buildings with SU ∈ 1, 2, ..., SMAX and compute the aggregate rental





. To obtain an estimate of ωU , we
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regress the log of RUSU against the log of S
U . With this approach, we obtain an
estimate of the height elasticity of average rent of ωR = 0.056 given a residential
floor elasticity of rent βR = 0.07 for buildings up to a height of SMAX = 40 stories.
For buildings up to SMAX = 10, ωR drops to 0.047. For commercial properties, we
find ωC = 0.026 for SMAX = 40 and ωC = 0.022 for SMAX = 10.
The somewhat lower floor elasticity for commercial than for residential buildings
is consistent with luxurious condominiums occupying the upper floors in mixed-used
skyscrapers such as the Woolworth Tower in New York or the Shard in London.
However, we wish to highlight that the commercial data we use are office rents,
while the residential data are condominium purchasing prices. The conclusion that
returns to height are greater within residential than commercial buildings rests on
the assumption that the capitalization rate of rents is independent of the floor.
Figure 15: Returns to height
Note: Log rent and log floor are residualised in regressions against unit characteristics and building fixed effects
and time effects. The displayed non-linear functions are the outcome of locally weighted regressions using a
Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.2. Confidence bands are at the 95% level. We trim the data set to exclude
outliers that fall into the bottom or top percentile in terms of residualised ln rent or residualised ln floor before
estimating the non-parametric gradient to improve the presentation. The parametric elasticity estimates are from
the full sample. Residential rents are implied rents based on apartment prices data from StreetEasy, assuming a
constant discount rate. Commercial asking rents are from Cushman Wakefield
6.2 Returns to height over time
Figure 16 summarizes year-specific estimates of the residential floor elasticity of rent
over 22 years in New York City. Since the early 2000s, there has been a remarkable
decline in the returns to height that is seemingly at odds with the notion that skilled
workers increasingly demand amenities (Glaeser et al., 2001). However, it is quite
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notable that the decrease in the height premium coincides with an expansion of the
supply of tall residential buildings. The number of completed residential buildings
that exceed 90 meters more than doubled over the course of the 2000s, before the
financial crisis led to a temporary dip. If there is heterogeneity in preferences,
(implicit) prices are generally not independent of supply. One interpretation of the
patterns observed in Figure 16 is that there is significant dispersion in tastes for
height. As the availability of the height amenity has increased, the valuation of the
marginal buyer has decreased.
Figure 16: Returns to height over time in the New York City residential market
Note: The floor elasticity of rent is estimated in regressions of log rent against log floor by year, controlling for
unit characteristics and building fixed effects. Confidence bands are at the 95% level. Residential rents are implied
rents based on apartment prices data from StreetEasy, assuming a constant discount rate. Building completions
count from Emporis.
6.3 Related research
Extant empirical work substantiates our empirical finding that there is a rent pre-
mium at higher floors. Unlike in the above estimates, however, many existing studies
do not control for building fixed effects. This is a limitation since estimates of ver-
tical rent gradients may be confounded by attributes of horizontal space that may
correlate with average building heights, such as distance from the CBD.
Koster et al. (2013) study rents in Dutch office buildings. They find that firms
are willing to pay a 4% premium to be in a building that is 10 meters taller. Their
findings suggest that the premium comes from a mix of agglomeration benefits,
views, and the status associated with working in a structure that stands out in the
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skyline (i.e., a ”landmark” effect). Shilton and Zaccaria (1994) and Colwell et al.
(1998) similarly find higher office rents in taller buildings. An exception in this
literature is Eichholtz et al. (2010), who find mixed results. Compared to previous
work, Liu et al. (2018) improve on the identification in that they control for building
fixed effects when estimating commercial vertical rent gradients across multiple U.S.
cities. They estimate significantly larger values of the floor elasticity of rent βC
of 0.086 within the CompStat data set and even 0.189 within the Offering memo
data set. Using the same procedure as above, we can translate these estimates into
estimates of the height elasticity of average rent ωC of 0.07 and 0.15 for buildings
up to SMAX = 40 floors.
As for residential height premiums, Wong et al. (2011) find a vertical price gra-
dient in Hong Kong apartments while Chau et al. (2007) find a price premium in
Hong Kong for those units that have a sea view. Danton and Himbert (2018) es-
timate that within buildings in Switzerland, residential rents increase by 1.5% per
floor. Their sample mostly consists of smaller structures. For the average floor of
two within their sample, the implied floor elasticity of rent βR is 0.03, somewhat less
than what we find of taller residential structures in New York City and Chicago.
Some of the more recent studies on vertical rent gradients have attempted to
identify the underlying mechanisms. In perhaps the first paper to include a measure
that controls for views, Nase et al. (2019) find that for the Amsterdam office market,
27% of the height premium is related to the view, while 70% is due to firm-level
signaling and other firm-specific factors. Liu et al. (2018) find evidence that firms in
the U.S. pay premiums not only for better amenities (views and sunlight) but also
to signal their productivity. They also document vertical sorting, with businesses
that generate higher revenues per worker, such as law firms, being located on higher
floors.
In contrast, businesses that value accessibility, such as retail, located on lower
floors, even paying a significant ground floor premium. Related to the “signaling
effect”, Dorfman et al. (2017) perform a novel behavioral study in which they explore
the perceptions of status and building height. In particular, they investigate how
people view the concept of power in regards to floor height. From their survey
analysis, they find that people perceive those residing on higher floors as being
more powerful. Ben-Shahar et al. (2007) apply a cooperative game theory model
to allocate the land and construction costs among the stories of the building. They
show how the desire for status can generate a height premium in the cost allocation
game.
Liu et al. (2020) show that the vertical employment density gradient follows the
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vertical rent gradient, just like the horizontal density gradient follows the horizontal
rent gradient. Hence, there is a u-shaped relationship between worker density and
height, consistent with firms optimally adjusting factor inputs to factor prices.
6.4 Potential for future research
Despite recent progress, there are still relatively few studies that explore vertical rent
gradients controlling for location via building effects. In particular, the evidence is
thin for commercial buildings outside the U.S. and tall residential buildings more
generally.
There is no substantial evidence on how returns to height have changed in the
long run. In determining optimal building heights, returns to height are isomorphic
to the costs of height (see Section 4.1). Hence, in terms of rationalizing the evolution
of the urban height gradient over time, understanding changes in returns to height
is as important as understanding changes in the cost of height.
The origins of the residential vertical rent gradient have remained understudied.
Disentangling the effect of a view amenity from other height effects such as prestige
is a fairly obvious research question. Similarly, little is known about heterogeneity in
the valuation of the height amenity. Estimates of the income elasticity of the height
amenity would be informative with respect to vertical and horizontal sorting. If
richer households were willing to pay a greater height premium, tall buildings could
contribute to spatial income segregation through a preference channel, in addition
to an affordability channel.
Despite the notion that certain agglomeration effects such as knowledge spillovers
are highly localized (Rosenthal and Strange, 2001), productivity spillovers within
buildings have remained under-researched. Decades of research into horizontal ag-
glomeration effects naturally suggest that priority areas for research into vertical
spillovers should include causal estimates of the vertical within-building spillovers
after controlling for selection; the attenuation of spillovers over vertical distances;
the relative importance of information and input sharing, matching, and learning
within buildings; and the co-location benefits across industries (see Combes and
Gobillon (2015) for a recent review of the empirics of agglomeration).
7 Sticky Adjustment
So far, our analysis has been guided by a competitive equilibrium framework in
which, for given costs and returns to height, there is a direct mapping from location-
specific rents to optimal location-specific building heights. We have assumed that
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the distribution of fundamental productivity and amenity is continuous, and the city
is perfectly malleable; hence, all gradients are “smooth”. In this section, we discuss
why, in reality, short buildings survive in central cities.
7.1 Anecdotal evidence
Recent research into the fractal dimensions of cities reveals that the shape of skylines
is more irregular than the already pretty irregular shape of city boundaries (Anas
et al., 1998; Qin et al., 2015). Economically, an irregular building height profile can
be rationalized with differences in the amenity and productivity of locations that
translate into variations in rents. Since short and tall buildings often stand side-
by-side, this explanation is not fully satisfactory. A walk down a typical block in
Lower Manhattan will reveal 19th-century low-rise buildings wedged next to 50-story
skyscrapers. At this scale, it is difficult to think of differences in fundamentals that
give rise to correspondingly large variation in rents.
To document micro-geographic variation in height more systematically, we illus-
trate the average height within one-kilometer distance-from-the-CBD bin along side
the standard deviation in heights within these bins for New York City and Chicago
in Figure 17. Even within just one kilometer from the the CBDs in New York City
and Chicago, the standard deviation in building heights is about as large as the
average height. Even with highly localized agglomeration spillovers in knowledge-
based tradable services (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008), it is difficult to rationalize
this degree of variation in heights within such a small area. The degree of variation
in heights within bins near the CBD is all the more striking as the coefficient of
variation drops sharply after about five kilometers. Although more remote bins are
much larger, the relative variation in heights is much lower.
There are several institutional explanations for this remarkable degree of micro-
geographic variation in in downtown building heights. Land use regulations and
historic preservation are obvious candidates. New York City zoning rules, for exam-
ple, limit the amount of floor area on each block. Owners of smaller buildings with
“extra” floor area can sell it to owners of neighboring properties. They then forego
any future densification of their properties, and the result is a persistent difference
in the height of neighboring buildings.
Property rights also matter. Public ownership may deter teardowns since evicting
residents can be politically costly. As an example, municipal governments in China
typically sign 70-year land leases with residential developers. When these leases run
out in the coming decades, governments may face pressure to renew them to avoid
redevelopment and mass displacement. Large cities in the U.S. that own public
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housing projects face similar pressures.
The protection of sitting tenants, such as under the U.S. rent control and stabi-
lization laws, implies that landlords cannot redevelop their properties if some tenants
exercise their right of lease renewals. If ownership is private but fragmented, such
as in a coop, condominium, or homeowner association, selected owners can veto the
redevelopment of a property, even if there is a clear economic case.
In addition to these institutional origins, there are some more sources of stickiness
that have received more attention in economics research and which we review below.
.
Figure 17: Variation in height
Note: Point zero n New York City is the Empire State Building. CBD in Chicago is W. Jackson Blvd. and S.
Dearborn Sts. Data from the NYC PLUTO File and the Chicago Building Footprints Shapefile
7.2 Related literature
The economics literature has brought forth at least three not mutually exclusive
explanations for why the sheer scale of skyscrapers may lead to “stickiness” in ad-
justments to changing economic circumstances.
Holdouts Skyscrapers generally require large lots to make the economics work.
In dense older cities like New York, lots on a block can be owned by several owners.
A developer of a tall building then needs to assemble lots. During this process,
owners of one or two strategically-located lots may refuse to sell in an effort to extra
monopoly rents (Cunningham, 2013; Strange, 1995). This is the holdout problem.
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To avoid this problem, developers typically buy lots in secret. Still, if a block has
many small lots with different owners, it may take years or decades even to assemble
a sufficiently large parcel for the development of a skyscraper.
Durability Tall buildings by their very nature are frequently expected to last
decades if not centuries. Beyond marginal changes, it is not economically feasible to
adjust the height of existing tall structures as this would require additional elevator
shafts and reinforcements of structural components and foundations. Brueckner
(2000) provides a summary of the standard land-use models that incorporate the
durable nature of structures. Some models assume that structures are infinitely-
lived, and new ones get added on the urban core as the city expands. Other models
assume redevelopment based on depreciation and changing prices. Henderson et al.
(2016) nicely illustrate how adding a dynamic element to the land use model can
produce “jagged” or fractal spatial structure in regard to its structural density.
Options Value An owner of a central-city vacant or under-utilized lot must decide
on the timing of construction (Williams, 1991). Because of the inherent uncertainty
and the long lag between ground breaking and opening, developers cannot always
correctly predict the revenue they will obtain upon opening. Consistent with op-
tions theory, Barr (2010) shows empirically that price uncertainty delays skyscraper
construction in Manhattan. Due to strategic interaction, option values that build up
over time are capitalized periodically, leading to waves of local development under
different fundamentals with correspondingly differing economic heights (Grenadier,
1995, 1996; Schwartz and Torous, 2007).
7.3 Potential for future research
Except for Barr (2010), there is no work that empirically explores the timing of
skyscraper construction, or how tall building durability might affect future con-
struction. In most larger, older cities, like New York and London, the vast majority
of structures were built before World War II. This suggests a tremendous lock-in
force at work once the decision to build is made. Skyscrapers rarely get torn down,
and the implications for spatial structure, agglomeration effects, and the quality
of urban life are worth exploring. Closely related, there is also scope for research
linking the increasing option value of vacant land (Barr et al., 2018) to the timing




Intuitively, skyscrapers are so tall and heavy that they need to be stabilized in some
way so that they do not lean or deferentially settle (or fall over). This intuition
underpins the use of geological conditions as relevant instruments for density in the
identification of agglomeration spillovers (Rosenthal and Strange, 2008; Combes et
al., 2011). In this section, we review the research into geology as a determinant of
the cost of construction of tall buildings.
8.1 Related research
Deeply embedded in New York’s historiography is that skyscrapers are “missing”
between Downtown and Midtown because the bedrock in that area (which includes
Greenwich Village and the Lower East Side) is far below the surface. From a de-
tailed inspection of building heights and bedrock depths, however, Barr et al. (2011)
conclude that subsoil supply-related conditions play a much less important role for
skyscraper formation than demand for space in the two economic centers. Where
engineers encountered difficulties regarding the geological conditions, they were able
to devise innovative methods to make skyscrapers cost effective. That said, there
is some evidence that, conditional on the decision to develop a skyscraper within
Downtown, developers may have “moved” their skyscrapers to locations with more
favorable geological conditions. So, bedrock appears to be a relevant determinant
of building heights in New York at a micro-geographic level primarily.
Closely related, Barr and Tassier (2016) show that the rise of Midtown as a sepa-
rate skyscraper district was due to the agglomerative forces related to shopping and
commercial activity north of 14th Street. This commercial district emerged after
the U.S. Civil War, following the northward expansion of Manhattan’s residential
districts. Having become the natural focal point on a long and narrow island, Mid-
town was the second location after Downtown where demand drove rents above the
threshold that made skyscrapers economically viable. Taken together, Barr et al.
(2011) and Barr and Tassier (2016) demonstrate that Manhattan’s skyline shape
was driven by the demand side and not the supply side.
The evidence does not substantiate that bedrock depths are a major determi-
nant of building heights in New York. To rationalize this result, it is worth consid-
ering that Chicago, another early adopter of the skyscraper technology, was built
on “swampy soil” (Bentley and Masengarb, 2015). Thus, bedrock is not a binding
requirement for the construction of skyscrapers. Although skyscrapers are anchored
directly to the bedrock where it is easily accessible, there are relatively cost-effective
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alternatives. Typically, if there is no bedrock near the surface, foundations are cre-
ated by boring long piles into the subsoil and then placing a concrete mat on top
of them, with the structure built on top of the mat. It is not clear that anchoring a
skyscraper to bedrock is necessarily always the cheaper alternative. As an example,
accessing bedrock in downtown Manhattan is quite difficult because on top of the
rock floor is viscous, wet quicksand with boulders scattered throughout. Engineers
had to devise expensive caisson technology in order to build foundations in lower
Manhattan (Barr, 2016). And even if establishing the foundations for a tall building
on bedrock is cheaper, the cost of stabilizing a building may not vary greatly in
height. In fact, in 1929 Manhattan foundation costs were found to be essentially
independent of height (Clark and Kingston, 1930).
8.2 Potential for future research
The role of environmental factors of the location and heights of skyscrapers remains
understudied. Recent work has looked at the role of geology on housing prices (Saiz,
2010; Burchfield et al., 2006), but there are no studies have analysed how geology
effects foundation costs since the late 19th century. Further evidence on the impact
of below-ground conditions on the cost of tall buildings from a larger sample of
cities would be useful to substantiate the case for using geology as an instrument
for agglomeration.
9 “Too Tall” Height
A profit-maximizing developer will build a structure such that at the last floor, the
marginal cost of adding that floor equals the marginal revenues. In this section, we
review the literature that has conjectured that skyscrapers, measured against this
benchmark, may be “too tall”.
9.1 Anecdotal evidence
As discussed in Sections 5 and 6, average construction costs are positively convex
in height and exceeding returns to height at the margin. Thus, at a given time and
location, there exists an optimal economic height of the building that maximizes
the profits. However, if tall buildings serve non-economic objectives, some buildings
may be too tall, in the sense that the chosen height had a marginal cost exceeds the
marginal revenue, at the time of completion.2 The debate about whether skyscrap-
2Bercea et al. (2005) argue that in the 16th century, the Roman Catholic church used cathedrals
to signal their power when faced with competition from Protestantism.
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ers, as a class of structures, or particular buildings, are too tall has a long and
contentious history, which began in New York City at the end of the 19th-century.3
In 1930, Clark and Kingston (1930) wrote their book, The Skyscraper: Study
in the Economic Height of Modern Office Buildings, to argue that those who called
skyscrapers “freak buildings,” misunderstood the economics of building tall. They
argued that tall buildings were inherently a function of high land values, and they
aimed to silence critics who felt that tall buildings were an inefficient use of land.
Nonetheless, they published their book during a famous “height race” in New
York City, at the end of the Roaring Twenties (Tauranac, 1997). In 1930, the Bank
of Manhattan (283 meters) topped out its world-record-breaking building, only to
soon be beaten by the Chrysler Building (318 meters), which within a year was
beaten by the Empire State Building (381 meters) in 1931. This race to dominate
the skyline has only fueled the perception that ego-driven developers are imposing
their will on the skyline, and the economics be damned (Barr, 2016).
There is also the perception that developers of the world’s tallest building add
extra-height to preempt would-be entrants, thus allowing the record holders to keep
their records for extra time. Supporters of this theory can point to the Empire State
Building, which held its record for 40 years. Based on the data in Figure 1, 40% of
record holders held their title for more than ten years. However, there are also cases
of rapid-fire succession. 40 Wall Street held its record for a matter of months. The
Twin Towers lost their record within a year. And the Petronas Towers (1999) (only
a record due to its spires, not its floor count) lost its record to the Taipei 101 within
five years.
More broadly, the ability to use case studies to generalize about the motivations
of record-breaking developers is limited. The reasons for building “too tall” are
multifaceted. Cities in Asia have more complex land markets and greater government
involvement in supertall projects. Skyscrapers may have additional second-order
economic benefits that can be confused for or correlated with “ego-based” height.
This can include various types of advertising or signaling, and which may come
from the builder, the occupants, the city, or the nation (Watts et al. (2007), Garza
(2017), Garza (2017)). Developers may also use their structures as “loss leaders”
to increase land values of surrounding properties and to draw income from tourism.
Observation decks in the clouds are profitable ventures.
3Note that in 1893, Chicago began a half-century of capping its building heights, thus 
disquali-fying itself from the debate about whether its buildings were too tall or not.
44
9.2 The Literature on Height Competition
Helsley and Strange (2008) offer a game-theoretic model of height competition. They
observe that across the world, a city’s tallest building is often much higher than the
second tallest building. They argue that if two developers are vying to claim the
prize of the “tallest building” for bragging rights or personal satisfaction (i.e., ego),
then a pure-strategy equilibrium will have one builder constructing a building so tall
it will have zero economic profit. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, each builder will
assign a positive probability to building too tall. In a sequential game, developers
deliberately build extra tall to deter competitors. In short, they demonstrate that
“too tall” construction can be rationalized theoretically.
Prompted by this theoretical contribution, there has been some work on em-
pirically measuring the effects of height competition. However, it has remained a
challenge to separate competition effects from the effects of unobserved fundamen-
tals, so the evidence is best interpreted as suggestive.
Barr (2010) studies the economics of skyscraper construction in Manhattan using
time series data from 1895 to 2004. He estimates the economic heights and number
of completions with a regression that includes economic fundamentals. While he
cannot rule out height competition from time to time and for particular buildings,
skyscraper heights, on average, are consistent with economic fundamentals.
Barr (2012) analyses the effects of height competition by regressing the heights
of a newly-completed buildings on a weighted average of the heightsof surrounding
structures (completed before or contemporaneously). The estimate for the spatial
autoregressive parameter turns out to be positive and statistically significant, but
is economically small. Extra height is mostly added during boom times when the
forgone profits are relatively more affordable.
Barr (2013) investigates height competition between two rivaling skyscraper
cities, namely New York and Chicago. He uses time-series measures of each other
city’s skyscraper construction (average heights and completions) to estimate skyscraper
reaction functions. He finds that each city adds heights in response to the (lag of)
building activity in the other city, but, again, the interaction coefficients are eco-
nomically small.
Barr and Luo (2020) analyze skyscraper construction across Chinese cities. They
find that local GDP and population are strong predictors of skyscraper height and
completions, which suggests that China’s rapid urbanization is driving the rise of
its skylines. They also find that cities with younger officials build taller skyscrapers,
suggesting the desire to use icons for career promotion in a system where municipal
officials control land use through land leases (Brueckner et al., 2017). From spatial
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autoregressions, they infer that same-tier cities are competing against each other in
the height market, in order to advertise their cities and its officials.
Using a different approach that draws from the spatial point-pattern literature
(Duranton and Overman, 2005), Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2015) document that the
completion of a very tall building is followed by a period of less ambitious construc-
tions in the immediate neighbourhood. While this finding is consistent with the
sequential-game predictions of the Helsley and Strange (2008) model, an existing
tall building may also lead to a lower economic height for subsequent buildings due
to a lower view amenity.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that there may be a strategic element in
height decisions, but that the effects of fundamentals dominate.
9.3 Other related research
White Elephants Gjerløw and Knutsen (2019) test the hypothesis that auto-
cratic leaders build “white elephants” as symbols of their reigns, or to demonstrate
their power to muster significant resources, or to provide work or provide incomes
to their supporters. They show that going from maximum democracy to maximum
autocracy is associated with about one extra skyscraper, ceteris paribus. They also
find that autocracies are more likely to add more “vanity height” to their structures,
where vanity height is the difference between the roof-line and the height of the top-
most part of the building. They interpret this extra height as the desire to signal
the power of autocratic leaders.
Urban Planning and Growth Anecdotally, cities world-over appear to be using
supertall buildings as catalysts of urban development and renewal. For example,
the so-called Three Brothers of Shanghai (the Jin Mao Tower, the Shanghai World
Financial Center, and the Shanghai Tower) were part of the master plan for Lujiazui
financial district. The Burj Kalifa and the Jeddah Tower (under-construction) are
central features of new neighborhoods being developed. The original Twin Towers in
New York were part of a strategy to modernize and re-invigorate lower Manhattan,
which had fallen on hard times after World War II. Unlike for sports stadia (Coates,
2007; Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos, 2014), there is no work in economics that explores how
skyscrapers induce land values, house prices, or foreign direct investment.
The skyscraper curse The so-called Skyscraper Curse alleges that supertall
building completions are a herald of economic doom (Lawrence, 1999). Support-
ers point to the Empire State Building, completed in 1931, and the Burj Khalifa,
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completed in 2010, to show that these towers were finished during severe downturns.
Since there are about twice as many record-breaking builds than economic crises
over the past 100 years, it is relatively easy to “manually” pair record-breaking
buildings with business cycle peaks. Barr et al. (2015) are the first to rigorously test
the skyscraper curse hypothesis using Granger-causality analysis. The result is that
height cannot be used to predict the business cycles, but economic growth can be
used to forecast building heights.
9.4 Potential or future research
Each generation redefines its own “normal” building height. In the late 19th century,
15 stories was considered excessive. By the 1920s, 40 stories was not uncommon.
Today 100-story structures are regularly built. As the barriers to building height
continue to fall away, the debate about whether skyscrapers are too tall keeps re-
newing itself.
Empirical research into whether the tallest structures in the world are, in fact,
economically too tall remains challenging due to data limitations. Thus far, com-
prehensive data that are readily accessible are confined to completed heights of
buildings and the general economic climate in which they are built. Building-level
data on revenues and the costs of land acquisition and construction cost will be key
to evaluating the economic case for building super-tall.
Since skyscrapers are durable and there are significant construction lags, expec-
tations matter for building height decisions. Seemingly excessive structures may
be result of perfectly foreseen economic growth or a myopically extrapolated real
estate boom. Understanding the extent to which cyclical vertical growth can be
rationalized under perfect foresight may be informative with respect to the role of
expectations on real estate markets more generally.
10 Regulation and externalities
In this section, we review the literature on causes and effects of regulation that seeks
to address external effects skyscraper may have on their cities and neighbourhoods.
10.1 Anecdotal evidence
When tall buildings started to rise in U.S. cities at the end of the 19th century,
planners and officials were concerned about shadows, increased traffic congestion,
increased risk of conflagrations, and correspondingly reduced property values of
surrounding buildings (Heights of Buildings Commission, 1913; Hoxie, 1915).
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While some cities, like Chicago and Boston, placed direct height caps on their
buildings, New York never did. In 1916, it implemented the first comprehensive
zoning regulations in the nation. Rather than capping heights, it mandated setback
rules that required tall buildings to set back from the street line as they rose taller.
This gave rise to the so-called “wedding-cake style” architecture. The purpose of
this regulation was to increase sunlight on the streets and reduce total building area
and congestion. New York’s codes were widely copied throughout the country in the
1920s (Weiss, 1992). These policies were not based on rigorous social cost-benefit
analyses. Instead, planners followed their own normative judgements under the
constraint that the imposed regulation should not be overturned by courts (Weiss,
1992; Bertaud, 2018).
Today, cities around the world generally attempt to control building height and
density by capping the maximum allowable floor area ratios (FARs). The FAR is
the total building area divided by the lot area. For example, the maximum allowable
FAR for Manhattan office buildings is 15 (or 18 if open space is provided). Similarly,
for Chicago, the maximum FAR is 12. To put these numbers in perspective, the
maximum FAR for Paris, a “flat” city, is 3 (Brueckner and Sridhar, 2012).
In keeping with intuition, Figure 18 shows a positive correlation between max-
imum allowable central-city FARs on the one hand, and the number and height
of skyscrapers on the other, for cities around the world. The relationship, how-
ever, is quite noisy, suggesting that the causes and effects of regulation of vertical
growth are highly context-dependent. As an example, the most vertical cities of the
world, Hong Kong and New York have many and tall skyscrapers despite the FAR
regulation being more restrictive than in Tokyo or Singapore.
10.2 Related research
Gyourko and Molloy (2015) provide a review of a sizable literature on the causes and
effects of effects of building regulation. The literature specifically concerned with
height regulation is somewhat thinner but growing.
In general, it appears that FAR regulation tends to be binding. In several anal-
yses, Barr (2010, 2012, 2013) concludes that zoning regulations in New York and
Chicago reduce building heights. Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018) find that in Chicago,
the building footprints of taller buildings cover a smaller fraction of the land par-
cel. This relationship reflects that for developers to go tall, they must reduce the
floor plate sizes in order to maintain the maximum allowable FAR. Sometimes, ex-
tra height is allowed in return for publicly accessible open space, further reducing
the floor plate. Theoretically, the partial equilibrium effect of a forced reduction in
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Figure 18: Skyscrapers and FAR regulation US
Sources: Floor area ratio data from Brueckner and Sridhar (2012). Skyscraper data:
https://www.skyscrapercenter.com/
the intensity of development of a land parcel must be to restrict its value. Indeed,
Brueckner et al. (2017) show that the greater the FAR stringency imposed by local
officials in China, the greater is the reduction in land values. Brueckner and Singh
(2020) find a similar effect on vacant land sales prices in five cities in the U.S. Moon
(2019) substantiates this finding in a detailed analysis of the New York City land
market.
Naturally, height restrictions have welfare consequences, some of which are un-
intended. Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) and Brueckner and Sridhar (2012) demon-
strate that the very low allowable FARs in Indian cities increase sprawl and traffic
congestion. Hence, the attempt to reduce externalities from building density has
produced a new suite of negative externalities. Since binding height restrictions, ce-
teris paribus, reduce housing supply, the general equilibrium effect is to raise house
prices above the marginal cost of construction, adding to affordability problems
(Glaeser et al., 2005).
Using a database of nearly every 80-meter or taller building on the planet, Jedwab
et al. (2020) compute the building-height gap by country. The measure, depicted
in Figure 19, summarizes how much building height per capita falls short of the
predicted value for given fundamentals under laissez-faire regulation. Considering
their economic potential, European countries and the U.S. under-perform in terms of
vertical growth, most likely due to planning regulations. The gap measure positively
correlates with measures of sprawl, housing prices, and air pollution, suggesting costs
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of regulation.
Figure 19: Per-capita height gaps by country
Note: The height gap measures by how much total height of tall buildings in per-capita terms falls short of the
predicted value under laissez-fair regulation (for given fundamentals). The measure is constructed for 149 countries
in 2020. Positive values (red shades) indicate more stringent regulation. Source: Jedwab et al. (2020).
In some cities, planners seek to mitigate negative externalities by ensuring that
tall buildings are aesthetically appealing. Cheshire and Dericks (2020) study the
impact of tight building height regulations in London, where skyscrapers have to go
through an approval process since there is no “as-of-right“ development as in New
York or Chicago. The authors document that developers employing so-called Tro-
phy Architects—those that won one of three prestigious architectural awards—are
allowed to build 14-floors taller than otherwise, a sizable magnitude in a reasonably
flat city. They interpret the one-and-a-half-fold increase in site value due to the
extra permitted height as the compensation of the cost of rent-seeking and, thus, an
indirect measure of dead-weight loss.
Ironically, some of the unintended negative effects of height restrictions may
have socially desirable second-order effects. Borck (2016) shows theoretically how
building height regulation leads to lower housing consumption due to a supply-driven
increase in house prices, which leads to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. In
his model with a global emissions externality, the welfare effect is non-monotonic
and, depending on the value of the externality, either the absence of height regulation
or a very stringent regulation can be socially desirable.
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10.3 Potential for future research
Much of the literature on height regulation is concerned with the negative collateral
effects. One naturally wonders how these costs compare to potential benefits that
motivate height regulations in the first instance. There is some evidence pointing to
amenity values of sunshine (Fleming et al., 2018) and distinctive design (Ahlfeldt and
Holman, 2018), suggesting that a regulation that reducse shadowing and improves
the design of tall buildings may have positive effects. Also, while very tall buildings
likely reduce sprawl and encourage mass transit, they tend to produce more CO2 on
per square meter, so that their environmental impact is theoretically ambiguous.
There is an evident polarization between opponents and proponents of tall build-
ings. The former argue that skyscrapers are, aesthetically speaking, “too big” for
the “human scale” (Gehl, 2013) and an anathema to the vibrant city that Jason
Jacobs (1961) argued for. The latter focus on the cost of height restrictions that
materialize in sprawl and affordability problems. Yet, only a quantitative evalua-
tion of the positive and negative external effects of tall buildings enables setting
the appropriate Pigovian tax for a transition into a first-best optimum of building
heights.
Likely, the degree of stringency of height regulation varies significantly across
cities around the world because the external costs and benefits vary, too. Develop-
ing an understanding of external costs and benefits of skyscrapers that account of
heterogeneity across institutional context is an ambitious research agenda that will
likely remain topical for quite some time.
11 Conclusion
The high-level conclusion of our synthesis is that the literature engaging with the
economics of tall buildings is still at an early stage. We have discussed the potential
for future research throughout Sections 4 to 10. Below, we offer an admittedly
subjective selection of three priority areas for research into the vertical dimension of
cities.
First, there is a long way to go in understanding how the positive and negative
externalities associated with tall buildings play out on balance. Skyscrapers may
not just accommodate productive workers in productive locations but also facilitate
gains in productivity, ceteris paribus, if the vertical cost of interaction is sufficiently
low. If well-designed skyscrapers put neighbourhoods or cities on the map, they
may attract businesses and tourism. At this same time, skyscrapers may generate
external costs in the form of shadowing, congestion, or the loss of a coherent historic
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fabric.
Second, there is scope for exploring the costs of and returns to height more
fully. Costs of and returns to height appear to be non-linear, and there are likely
threshold effects that could be explored with richer data sets. Heterogeneity in the
cost of height across uses and the value of the height amenities across users is not
only interesting in its own right but also has implications for the horizontal pattern
of land use and sorting. The net cost of height is one of the main congestive forces
and a better understanding of how it evolves over time is helpful with respect to
rationalizing changes in the spatial structure in the past as well as anticipating the
evolution of cities in the future.
Third, there are forces outside the canonical competitive equilibrium framework
that shape the urban height profile and deserve more attention. As an example,
disentangling the effects of height competition from fundamentals that would jus-
tify extreme building heights remains an empirical challenge. Progress on this front
will be essential for economically rationalizing skyscrapers such as the Empire State
Building or the Burj Khalifa, which dominate height rankings for decades and ex-
emplify the frontier of technological innovation and human ambition.
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as Rent-seeking: Quantifying Deadweight Losses in a Tightly Regulated Office
Market,” Economica, 2020.
Clark, William Clifford and John Lyndhurst Kingston, The Skyscraper:
Study in the Economic Height of Modern Office Buildings, American Institute
of Steel, 1930.
Coates, Dennis, “Stadiums and arenas: Economic development or economic re-
distribution?,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 2007, 25 (4), 565–577.
Colwell, Peter F, Henry J Munneke, and Joseph W Trefzger, “Chicago’s
Office Market: Price Indices, Location and Time,” Real Estate Economics, 3 1998,
26 (1), 83–106.
Combes, Pierre-Philippe and Laurent Gobillon, “Chapter 5 - The Empirics
of Agglomeration Economies,” in Gilles Duranton, J Vernon Henderson, William
C B T Handbook of Regional Strange, and Urban Economics, eds., Handbook of
Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 5, Elsevier, 2015, pp. 247–348.
, Gilles Duranton, and Laurent Gobillon, “The identification of agglomera-
tion economies,” Journal of economic geography, 2011, 11 (2), 253–266.
, , and , “The Production Function for Housing: Evidence from France,”
Working paper, 2016.
, , and , “The Costs of Agglomeration: House and Land Prices in French
Cities,” The Review of Economic Studies, 10 2018, 86 (4), 1556–1589.
, , , and Sebastien Roux, “Estimating Agglomeration Economies With
History, Geology, and Worker Effects,” in “Agglomeration Economics,” Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2010, pp. 15–66.
Condit, Carl W, “The two centuries of technical evolution underlying the
Skyscraper,” in “Second Century of the Skyscraper,” 11–24, 1988, pp. 11–24.
Cunningham, Chris, “Estimating the holdout problem in land assembly,” 2013.
Curci, Federico, “Vertical and horizontal cities: in which direction should cities
grow?,” Working paper, 2017.
56
, “The taller the better? Agglomeration determinants and urban structure,”
Working paper, 2020.
Danton, Jayson and Alexander Himbert, “Residential vertical rent curves,”
Journal of Urban Economics, 2018, 107, 89–100.
Department of the Environment, Local Authority Offices: Areas and Costs,
London: DOE, 1971.
Dorfman, Anna, Danny Ben-Shahar, and Daniel Heller, “Power and high
stories,” 2017.
Douglas, George H, Skyscrapers: A social history of the very tall building in
America, McFarland, 2004.
Duranton, Gilles and Henry G Overman, “Testing for localization using micro-
geographic data,” Review of economic studies, 2005, 72 (4), 1077–1106.
Eichholtz, Piet, Nils Kok, and John M Quigley, “Doing well by doing good?
Green office buildings,” The American Economic Review, 2010, 100 (5), 2492–
2509.
Epple, Dennis, Brett Gordon, and Holger Sieg, “A New Approach to Esti-
mating the Production Function for Housing,” American Economic Review, 2010,
100 (3), 905–924.
Fleming, David, Arthur Grimes, Laurent Lebreton, David Maré, and
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A1 Online appendix
This online appendix contain supplementary material not intended for publication.
A1.1 Parametrization
In this section, we provide additional detail on the parametrization of the theoretical
model introduced in 4.1.






subject to the budget constraint
y = pRF + C,
where AR is a location-specific residential utility shifter, C is a tradable good
with a price normalized to unity, F is floor space, pR is the residential floor space
price, and αR is the expenditure share on floor space. Using the Marshallian demand
functions C = αRy, F = (1−α
R)y
pR
and imposing that the spatial equilibrium anchors









1−αR is a scale parameter that collects some
constants.







π = X − pCF −K,
where AC is a location-specific commercial productivity shifter, X is a tradable
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good with a price normalized to unity, K is tradable capital with a price normalized






C and assuming zero economic profits in a perfectly competitive




where aC = (1− αC)(αC)
αC
1−αC is a scale parameter that collects some constants.
Bid rent In the below we index use by U ∈ R,C for convenience and assume that












where bu > 0 is a constant that determines the amenity level at the central point.
Developers We define height SU = F
U
L
as the ratio of floor space FU over the
land L occupied by a building at any location. Homogeneous developers choose SU
to maximize profits
πU(SU) = p̃USU − c̃USU − 1
dU
rU ,
where the average rent p̃U = pUSU
ωU
and the average cost c̃U = cUSU
θU
increase
in height at the elasticities ωU > 0 and θU > 0. dU = 1 is the fraction of a parcel
that is developable, which along with the land rent rU determines the land cost.







(1−αU )(ωU−θU ) ,









ωU−θU collects various constants.
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Land rent Using SU
∗
in the developer profit function and assuming zero profits
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